Tootfinder

Do you need a DAO?
Henrik Axelsen, Johannes Rude Jensen, Omri Ross
https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.11076 https://arxiv.org/pdf/2404.11076<…

Do you need a DAO?
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) have seen exponential growth and interest due to their potential to redefine organizational structure and governance. Despite this, there is a discrepancy between the ideals of autonomy and decentralization and the actual experiences of DAO stakeholders. The Information Systems (IS) literature has yet to fully explore whether DAOs are the optimal organizational choice. Addressing this gap, our research asks, "Is a DAO suitable for your organizationa…

Demystifying the DAO Governance Process
Junjie Ma, Muhui Jiang, Jinan Jiang, Xiapu Luo, Yufeng Hu, Yajin Zhou, Qi Wang, Fengwei Zhang
https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.11758

Demystifying the DAO Governance Process
Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) becomes a popular governance solution for decentralized applications (dApps) to achieve decentralized governance. In the DAO, no single entity can arbitrarily control the dApps without approval from the majority of members. However, despite its advantages, DAO has also been targeted by several attacks, leading to the loss of millions of dollars. In this paper, we first provided an overview of the DAO governance process within the blockchain. Next, we …

The Constitutions of Web3
Joshua Z. Tan, Max Langenkamp, Anna Weichselbraun, Ann Brody, Lucia Korpas
https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.00081 https://

The Constitutions of Web3
The governance of online communities has been a critical issue since the first USENET groups, and a number of serious constitutions -- declarations of goals, values, and rights -- have emerged since the mid-1990s. More recently, decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) have begun to publish their own constitutions, manifestos, and other governance documents. There are two unique aspects to these documents: they (1) often govern significantly more resources than previously-observed online c…

The Effects of Group Sanctions on Participation and Toxicity: Quasi-experimental Evidence from the Fediverse
Carl Colglazier, Nathan TeBlunthuis, Aaron Shaw
https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.02109

The Effects of Group Sanctions on Participation and Toxicity: Quasi-experimental Evidence from the Fediverse
Online communities often overlap and coexist, despite incongruent norms and approaches to content moderation. When communities diverge, decentralized and federated communities may pursue group-level sanctions, including defederation (disconnection) to block communication between members of specific communities. We investigate the effects of defederation in the context of the Fediverse, a set of decentralized, interconnected social networks with independent governance. Mastodon and Pleroma, the …

This https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.17655 has been replaced.
link: https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=a

Understanding Blockchain Governance: Analyzing Decentralized Voting to Amend DeFi Smart Contracts
Smart contracts are contractual agreements between participants of a blockchain, who cannot implicitly trust one another. They are software programs that run on top of a blockchain, and we may need to change them from time to time (e.g., to fix bugs or address new use cases). Governance protocols define the means for amending or changing these smart contracts without any centralized authority. They distribute the decision-making power to every user of the smart contract: Users vote on accepting…

The Economics of Blockchain Governance: Evaluate Liquid Democracy on the Internet Computer
Yulin Liu, Luyao Zhang
https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.13768 https://…

The Economics of Blockchain Governance: Evaluate Liquid Democracy on the Internet Computer
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), utilizing blockchain technology to enable collective governance, are a promising innovation. This research addresses the ongoing query in blockchain governance: How can DAOs optimize human cooperation? Focusing on the Network Nervous System (NNS), a comprehensive on-chain governance framework underpinned by the Internet Computer Protocol (ICP) and liquid democracy principles, we employ theoretical abstraction and simulations to evaluate its potenti…

Analyzing Games in Maker Protocol Part One: A Multi-Agent Influence Diagram Approach Towards Coordination
Abhimanyu Nag, Samrat Gupta, Sudipan Sinha, Arka Datta
https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.15037

Analyzing Games in Maker Protocol Part One: A Multi-Agent Influence Diagram Approach Towards Coordination
Decentralized Finance (DeFi) ecosystems, exemplified by the Maker Protocol, rely on intricate games to maintain stability and security. Understanding the dynamics of these games is crucial for ensuring the robustness of the system. This motivating research proposes a novel methodology leveraging Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams (MAID), originally proposed by Koller and Milch, to dissect and analyze the games within the Maker stablecoin protocol. By representing users and governance of the Maker p…